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ABSTRACT
Commentators have argued that, even if the president has the
unilateral authority to terminate Article II treaties concluded with the
Senate’s advice and consent, the president lacks the unilateral authority
to terminate “congressional-executive agreements” concluded with
majority congressional approval, such as the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA). This Article challenges that claim. If one
accepts a presidential authority to terminate Article II treaties, this
Article contends, there is no persuasive reason to conclude differently
with respect to congressional-executive agreements. Congressionalexecutive agreements have become largely interchangeable with Article
II treaties as a matter of domestic law and practice. For example, either
instrument can be used to address matters relating to international
commerce and trade. Moreover, while presidents cannot unilaterally
terminate statutes, congressional-executive agreements are not mere
statutes. They are, like Article II treaties, binding international
instruments that can be concluded by the United States only through
presidential action. These agreements also typically contain withdrawal
clauses similar to those contained in Article II treaties, which presidents
have long invoked unilaterally, and Congress has never indicated that
presidents have less withdrawal authority for such agreements. Indeed,
in its trade legislation, Congress appears to have accepted that
presidents may invoke such clauses unilaterally.
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INTRODUCTION
The election of Donald Trump to the presidency brought renewed
attention to the scope of the president’s authority to terminate the
United States’ international agreements. During his campaign, Trump
suggested that he might terminate various agreements, and after taking
office he announced his intent to withdraw the United States from the
Paris agreement on climate change.1 He has also threatened to
terminate various trade agreements, including NAFTA.2
The text of the Constitution does not specifically address this
question of presidential authority. Article II states that, in order to
make a treaty, the president must obtain the advice and consent of twothirds of the Senate,3 but it does not specify how such Article II treaties
are to be unmade. Moreover, it says nothing at all about either the
making or unmaking of “executive agreements,” even though such
agreements now constitute the vast majority of the United States’
1. See Lisa Friedman, U.S. to Join Climate Talks Despite Planned Withdrawal from Paris
Accord, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 4, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/04/climate/us-to-joinclimate-talks-despite-planned-withdrawal-from-paris-accord.html [https://perma.cc/7KW2-CY
UQ]; Michael D. Shear, Trump Will Withdraw U.S. from Paris Climate Agreement, N.Y. TIMES
(June 1, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/01/climate/trump-paris-climate-agreement.html
[https://perma.cc/96HQ-N65K].
2. See Ana Swanson, Trump’s Tough Talk on Nafta Raises Prospects of Pact’s Demise, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 11, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/11/business/economy/nafta-trump.html
[https://perma.cc/U9FK-CDUW].
3. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
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international agreements.4
In part because of longstanding historical practice, many
commentators have concluded that the president can act unilaterally
for the United States in terminating Article II treaties, at least when
international law permits termination.5 Some commentators who
accept this proposition nevertheless contend that the president lacks
unilateral
authority
to
terminate
congressional-executive
agreements—that is, international agreements concluded by presidents
with majority congressional authorization or approval, like NAFTA.6
This Article challenges that claim. If one accepts presidential authority
to terminate Article II treaties, this Article contends, there is no
persuasive reason to conclude differently with respect to
congressional-executive agreements.
Part I explains why presidential authority to terminate Article II
treaties is generally accepted, and it briefly describes the phenomenon
of executive agreements. Part II contests the claim that congressionalexecutive agreements differ from Article II treaties with respect to
presidential termination authority. Part III discusses other potential
constraints on presidential withdrawal from treaties and congressionalexecutive agreements. Part IV concludes.
I. PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORITY TO TERMINATE ARTICLE II
TREATIES
The U.S. Constitution describes how the United States can make
treaties, but it does not describe how it can terminate or withdraw from
them.7 Despite the lack of clear textual guidance, the generally

4. See infra Part II.
5. See infra Part I.
6. See, e.g., John C. Yoo, Laws as Treaties?: The Constitutionality of CongressionalExecutive Agreements, 99 MICH. L. REV. 757, 815 (2001); Julian Ku & John Yoo, Trump Might
Be Stuck with NAFTA, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 29, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oeyoo-ku-trump-nafta-20161129-story.html [https://perma.cc/C4GN-S565]; Joel P. Trachtman,
Power to Terminate U.S. Trade Agreements: The Presidential Dormant Commerce Clause
Versus an Historical Gloss Half Empty (Oct. 16, 2017) (unpublished manuscript),
https://papers.ssrn.com/ sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3015981 [https://perma.cc/HE5B-VNPQ].
Trachtman’s claim is similar to, but potentially narrower than, Yoo’s and Ku’s. He only contends
that presidents cannot terminate commerce-related congressional-executive agreements, and he
takes no definitive position on the termination of other types of congressional-executive
agreements.
7. See LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 211
(2d ed. 1996) (“[T]he Constitution tells us only who can make treaties for the United States; it
does not say who can unmake them.”).
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prevailing view is that the president can act unilaterally for the United
States in terminating treaties, at least when international law allows
withdrawal and Congress has not prohibited it. This view is reflected in
both the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United
States and in the new Restatement (Fourth).8
This Part describes why this has become the prevailing view. It
begins by briefly recounting the history of treaty terminations by the
United States. Next, it discusses the principal arguments in support of
unilateral presidential termination power. Finally, it describes the
phenomenon of executive agreements.
Before turning to these points, it is useful to have in mind some of
the international law rules governing treaty termination. These rules
are themselves set out in a treaty—the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties.9 Although the United States has not ratified the Vienna
Convention, the executive branch accepts that many provisions of the
Convention, including its termination provisions, reflect binding
customary international law.10 The International Court of Justice in
The Hague has also specifically observed that the Vienna Convention
provisions concerning termination “in many respects” reflect
customary international law.11
Under international law as reflected in the Vienna Convention,
nations can suspend, terminate, or withdraw from treaties under
various circumstances. Perhaps most obviously, they can enter into an
agreement with the other parties to the treaty to suspend or terminate
the treaty.12 In addition, many modern treaties contain clauses that
allow parties to withdraw without obtaining the agreement of other
parties, although such clauses often require a certain amount of notice
8. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 339 (AM. LAW INST. 1986) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)]; RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF
THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES: TREATIES § 113(1) (AM. LAW. INST.,
Tentative Draft No. 2, 2017) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) Draft 2]. I served as a
Reporter for the Restatement (Fourth). The views expressed in this Article are my own and do
not necessarily reflect the position of the Restatement (Fourth).
9. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331
[hereinafter Vienna Convention].
10. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 8, pt. 3, intro. note (documenting executive
branch statements); RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) Draft 2, supra note 8, § 113 reporters’ note 1
(same). Customary international law is the law of the international community that “results from
a general and consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation.”
RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 8, § 102(2).
11. See Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), Judgment, 1997 I.C.J. Rep. 7, ¶ 46
(Sept. 25).
12. See Vienna Convention, supra note 9, arts. 58, 59.
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before the withdrawal will take effect. Unsurprisingly, international
law allows such clauses.13 Even fundamental and wide-ranging treaties
often allow for withdrawal, as illustrated by Great Britain’s decision to
exit the European Union, or “Brexit.” International law further allows
a party to withdraw in response to particular developments, such as a
material breach of the treaty by another party, or a fundamental
change in circumstances.14
Importantly, these international law standards all govern the
behavior of nations and do not purport to determine which
governmental actors within each nation can terminate an international
agreement. Instead, that question is left for each nation to resolve
under its domestic law.15
A. A Brief Overview of U.S. Historical Practice
Throughout its history, the United States has terminated treaties
by a variety of procedures.16 The first time it did so was pursuant to a
statute. In 1798, on the eve of war with France, Congress passed and
President Adams signed legislation stating that the four treaties the
United States had with France at that time “shall not henceforth be
regarded as legally obligatory on the government or citizens of the
United States.”17 This appears to be the only instance in U.S. history in
which Congress purported to directly effectuate a treaty termination.
Importantly, this action was related to Congress’s authority to declare
war, a power that would inherently have been linked to treaty
termination at the Founding.18
13. See id. art. 54. In a recent book, Professor Koremenos estimates that approximately 70
percent of modern treaties contain withdrawal clauses. See BARBARA KOREMENOS, THE
CONTINENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: EXPLAINING AGREEMENT DESIGN 140–44 (2016); see
also Laurence R. Helfer, Exiting Treaties, 91 VA. L. REV. 1579, 1582 (2005) (“Treaty clauses that
authorize exit are pervasive. They are found in a wide array of multilateral and bilateral
agreements governing key transborder regulatory issues, including human rights, trade,
environmental protection, arms control, and intellectual property.”).
14. See Vienna Convention, supra note 9, arts. 60 ¶ 1, 62 ¶ 1.
15. See generally Laurence R. Helfer, Terminating Treaties, in THE OXFORD GUIDE TO
TREATIES (Duncan B. Hollis ed., 2012) (describing the international law rules governing treaty
termination and explaining that they are distinct from the domestic rules governing such
termination).
16. See generally Curtis A. Bradley, Treaty Termination and Historical Gloss, 92 TEX. L.
REV. 773 (2014) [hereinafter Bradley, Treaty Termination] (providing a history of American
treaty termination).
17. Act of July 7, 1798, ch. 67, 1 Stat. 578.
18. See, e.g., EMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS, bk. 3, ch. X, § 175 (J. Chitty ed.,
1854) (“The conventions, the treaties made with a nation, are broken or annulled by a war arising
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During the nineteenth century, the United States did not exit from
many treaties, but when it did so, presidents usually acted with some
sort of legislative authorization or approval.19 Congress sometimes
authorized presidents to terminate treaties in their discretion;20 at other
times, Congress directed the president to terminate.21 On rare
occasions, the Senate alone authorized presidential termination.22
When Congress attempted to compel termination of select articles
within treaties, however, presidents sometimes resisted on the ground
that such action was not permissible under the treaties.23
On other occasions in the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, such as in the Lincoln and Taft administrations, presidents
unilaterally terminated treaties and received approval after the fact
from either Congress or the Senate.24 In another somewhat unilateral
action, President Grant informed Congress in 1876 that he would

between the contracting parties . . . .”); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 8, § 339 cmt. a
(“Congress, as distinct from the Senate alone, might perhaps claim a voice in the termination of
a treaty where termination might create serious danger of war, in view of the authority of
Congress to decide for war or peace under Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution.”); Daniel J.
Hessel, Note, Founding-Era Jus Ad Bellum and the Domestic Law of Treaty Withdrawal, 125
YALE L.J. 2394, 2399 (2016) (arguing that “at the Founding, treaty withdrawal provided a just
cause of war under the law of nations” and that, “because the Constitution assigns Congress the
power to declare war, . . . the original understanding of the Constitution contemplated a
congressional treaty withdrawal power”).
19. See Bradley, Treaty Termination, supra note 16, at 788–96; see also HENKIN, supra note
7, at 211 (“At various times, the power to terminate treaties has been claimed for the President,
for the President-and-Senate, for President-and-Congress, for Congress.”).
20. See, e.g., Joint Resolution of Apr. 27, 1846, 9 Stat. 109, 109–10 (authorizing President
Polk “at his discretion” to terminate a treaty with Great Britain relating to the two countries’ joint
occupation of the Oregon Territory).
21. See, e.g., Joint Resolution of Mar. 3, 1883, 22 Stat. 441 (directing President Arthur to
terminate various articles in an 1871 treaty with Great Britain, which Arthur then acted to
terminate).
22. See, e.g., Franklin Pierce, Third Annual Message (Dec. 31, 1855), in 6 A COMPILATION
OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 2860, 2867 (James D. Richardson ed., 1897)
(explaining that President Pierce was terminating a treaty with Denmark “[i]n pursuance of the
authority conferred by a resolution of the Senate”).
23. See, e.g., Rutherford B. Hayes, Veto of the Chinese Immigration Bill, H.R. Exec. Doc.
No. 45-102, at 5 (3d Sess. 1879) (disputing that Congress can direct the abrogation of only parts
of a treaty, while accepting that Congress can direct the termination of the entire treaty); Press
Release, U.S. Dep’t of State 2–3 (Sept. 6, 1920) (on file with Duke Law Journal) (declining to
follow a congressional directive to terminate treaty obligations relating to customs duties because
the treaties in question did not allow for such partial termination).
24. See, e.g., Joint Resolution of Dec. 21, 1911, 37 Stat. 627 (stating that President Taft’s
notice of termination of a treaty with Russia was “adopted and ratified”); Joint Resolution of Feb.
9, 1865, 13 Stat. 568 (“adopt[ing] and ratif[ying]” President Lincoln’s termination of a treaty with
Great Britain).
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suspend U.S. compliance with an extradition treaty with Great Britain
because of that nation’s noncompliance, while noting that “[i]t is for
the wisdom of Congress to determine whether the article of the treaty
relating to extradition is to be any longer regarded as obligatory on the
Government of the United States.”25 The first entirely unilateral
presidential treaty termination may have been President McKinley’s
1899 termination of certain clauses in a commercial treaty with
Switzerland.26
During the twentieth century, and especially during and after the
administration of President Franklin Roosevelt, unilateral presidential
termination became the norm.27 Most of these presidential treaty
terminations have been uncontroversial. An important exception is
President Carter’s 1978 announcement that he was withdrawing the
United States from a mutual defense treaty with Taiwan, as part of his
recognition of the mainland Chinese government. The Taiwan defense
treaty, which the United States approved in 1954 with senatorial advice
and consent, provided that either party could withdraw after a year’s
notice. In Goldwater v. Carter,28 some members of Congress brought a
lawsuit challenging Carter’s authority to terminate the treaty.
Although the D.C. Circuit upheld Carter’s action, the Supreme Court
vacated the decision and ordered dismissal because it concluded that
the case was not justiciable.29 Thus, while the courts declined to stop
Carter’s treaty termination, Goldwater provided no definitive judicial
resolution of the legality of unilateral presidential termination.
The practice of unilateral presidential treaty termination has
continued. Since Goldwater, presidents have unilaterally terminated
dozens of treaties and, as before Goldwater, most of these terminations
25. Letter from Ulysses S. Grant to the Senate and House of Representatives (June 20,
1876), in 9 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 4324, 4327
(James D. Richardson ed., 1897).
26. See Letter from John Hay, U.S. Sec’y of State, to Ambassador Leishman (Mar. 8, 1899),
in PAPERS RELATING TO THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 733, 753–54 (1901).
The termination need not be viewed as purely unilateral in that McKinley was responding to a
conflict between the treaty and a federal statute. See Bradley, Treaty Termination, supra note 16,
at 799.
27. See Bradley, Treaty Termination, supra note 16, at 801–16.
28. Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
29. A plurality of four justices reasoned that that the case presented a political question. See
id. at 1002 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment). Providing a fifth vote for dismissal, Justice
Powell reasoned that the dispute was not sufficiently ripe because “Congress has taken no official
action,” and “[t]he Judicial Branch should not decide issues affecting the allocation of power
between the President and Congress until the political branches reach a constitutional impasse.”
Id. at 997–98 (Powell, J., concurring).
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have not generated controversy.30 One post-Goldwater termination
that did generate controversy was President George W. Bush’s 2002
announcement that he was withdrawing the United States from the
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty with Russia, pursuant to a withdrawal
clause. Thirty-two members of the House of Representatives
challenged the withdrawal, but the case was dismissed based on lack of
standing and the political question doctrine.31 Since that litigation,
presidents have unilaterally terminated a number of additional
treaties, without constitutional controversy.32
B. Arguments in Favor of Presidential Termination Authority
As a logical matter, the process constitutionally specified for
making treaties could reasonably be thought to be the default process
for unmaking them. If so, treaty termination would require the advice
and consent of two-thirds of the Senate. As the D.C. Circuit explained
in Goldwater, however, the constitutional analysis is more complicated
than that, for several reasons.33
First, when resolving separation of powers issues, courts often give
significant weight to longstanding governmental practice.34 As
discussed in Section A, since the early twentieth century, the vast
majority of U.S. treaty terminations have been accomplished by
unilateral presidential action. These terminations have encompassed a
broad range of treaties, from defense, to tax, to commerce. Moreover,

30. See Bradley, Treaty Termination, supra note 16, at 814–15.
31. See Kucinich v. Bush, 236 F. Supp. 2d 1, 2 (D.D.C. 2002); see also Beacon Prods. Corp.
v. Reagan, 633 F. Supp. 1191, 1198–99 (D. Mass. 1986) (relying on the political question doctrine
in dismissing a challenge to President Reagan’s termination of a treaty of “Friendship, Commerce,
and Navigation” with Nicaragua).
32. The Bush administration unilaterally terminated a protocol to a multilateral consular
convention in 2005 and a tax treaty with Sweden in 2007. See Bradley, Treaty Termination, supra
note 16, at 815. In 2016, the Obama administration unilaterally initiated withdrawal from a
multilateral fisheries treaty, but rescinded the notice of withdrawal after the treaty was
renegotiated. See U.S. DEP’T. OF STATE, DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 2016, at 149–50 (CarrieLyn D. Guymon ed., 2016), https://www.state.gov/
documents/organization/272128.pdf [https://perma.cc/3XN5-9TMB]; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t.
of State, Conclusion of the South Pacific Tuna Treaty Amendment Negotiations (Dec. 3, 2016),
https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2016/12/264807.htm [https://perma.cc/K6DY-AZRW].
33. See generally Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697 (D.C. Cir. 1979), vacated on other
grounds, 444 U.S. 996 (1979) (explaining the rationales underlying the D.C. Circuit’s decision).
34. See Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2091 (2015); NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct.
2550, 2559 (2014). See generally Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and
the Separation of Powers, 126 HARV. L. REV. 411 (2012) (discussing the role of historical practice
in constitutional interpretation relating to the separation of powers).
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with a couple of exceptions—most notably President Carter’s
termination of the Taiwan treaty at issue in Goldwater—these
presidential terminations have not generated controversy in Congress,
let alone any effort by Congress to restrict presidential termination.
Meanwhile, the Senate knows that presidents claim authority to invoke
withdrawal clauses unilaterally, and yet it routinely consents to treaties
containing such clauses without ever attempting to restrict presidential
action under them.
Second, there are structural reasons to question whether the
constitutional process for initiating governmental action must always
be followed for terminating governmental action. To be sure, this
regime applies to federal statutes. To terminate a federal statute,
governmental actors must follow the same process specified in the
Constitution for making a statute.35 But treaties are constitutionally
different from statutes in a number of respects. Perhaps most
significantly for present purposes, the United States can never
conclude a treaty without presidential agreement. Whereas Congress
can enact statutes over a presidential veto, it is well accepted that
Congress cannot cause the United States to join a treaty unless the
president agrees.36 Given that a treaty cannot be made without
presidential approval, arguably no treaty can stay in place without
presidential approval. Moreover, even though the president needs
senatorial consent to appoint federal officials, it is well accepted that
presidents can generally terminate such appointments unilaterally—
again confirming that initiation and termination can have different
processes.37
Third, certain well-accepted presidential powers in the diplomacy
and foreign relations areas inherently seem to carry with them some
treaty termination authority.38 For example, the Supreme Court has

35. See Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 438 (1998); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919,
954 (1983).
36. See, e.g., Zivotofsky, 135 S. Ct. at 2086 (noting that “the Senate may not conclude or
ratify a treaty without Presidential action”); HENKIN, supra note 7, at 37 (“The President need
not make a treaty, even if the Senate, or Congress, demands it.”); Oona A. Hathaway, Presidential
Power Over International Law: Restoring the Balance, 119 YALE L.J. 140, 209 (2009) (“[E]ven if
Congress fully supports an international agreement, that agreement cannot be made unless and
until the President communicates the country’s assent. Congress cannot force an unwilling
President to consent to an agreement.”).
37. As the D.C. Circuit noted in Goldwater, “[e]xpansion of the language of the Constitution
by sequential linguistic projection is a tricky business at best.” 617 F.2d at 704.
38. Some commentators also maintain that the first sentence of Article II of the
Constitution—that “[t]he executive Power shall be vested in a President”—implicitly conveys
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made clear that the president can determine which governments and
states the United States will recognize as legitimate, and indeed that
Congress cannot restrict this power.39 But the power to de-recognize
can sometimes amount to a power to suspend or terminate a treaty
obligation with a particular state; for example, when there has been a
change in the nature of the state entity, and thus a change in the nature
of the treaty obligation.40 In addition, as discussed below, presidents
can conclude executive agreements relating to matters within their
independent constitutional authority, and the exercise of that
noncontroversial power could in some instances suspend or terminate
earlier treaty commitments, including most obviously by unilaterally
making an agreement with the treaty partner to do so.
Fourth, there are originalist and functionalist reasons to resist the
conclusion that the process for making treaties must necessarily be
followed for their unmaking. The Founders created a cumbersome
process for making treaties—perhaps too cumbersome—in part
because they were worried about excessive foreign entanglements.
This concern does not necessarily imply that they sought to make it
equally cumbersome to get out of such entanglements. Indeed, U.S.
interests might be best served by having unilateral presidential
termination authority. For example, one accepted ground for
terminating a treaty is a material breach by the other treaty party. The
president may be in the best position to identify and react to such
breaches, both in terms of threatening a responsive U.S. action and
acting quickly if such a response becomes necessary. This leverage
would be substantially weaker if presidents needed legislative
consent.41
Finally, as a practical matter, treaty terminations become effective
on the international plane with or without domestic legal symmetry
between making and unmaking treaties. Under the Vienna
Convention, the head of state is presumed to be a sufficient national
certain powers to the president, including potentially the power to terminate treaties. See, e.g.,
Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power Over Foreign Affairs, 111
YALE L.J. 231 (2001). For skepticism about this interpretation of the clause, see Curtis A. Bradley
& Martin S. Flaherty, Executive Power Essentialism and Foreign Affairs, 102 MICH. L. REV. 545
(2004).
39. See Zivotofsky, 135 S. Ct. at 2094 (“[T]he power to recognize or decline to recognize a
foreign state and its territorial bounds resides in the President alone.”).
40. See SAMUEL B. CRANDALL, TREATIES, THEIR MAKING AND ENFORCEMENT 425–39 (2d
ed. 1916).
41. Cf. Goldwater, 617 F.2d at 706 (“In many of these situations the President must take
immediate action.”).
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representative for purposes of treaty termination and withdrawal.42
Because the president is the head of state for the United States, a
unilateral presidential notice of withdrawal will be effective under
international law, especially given the lack of any manifest U.S.
constitutional prohibition of such presidential action.43 This practical
point may cause courts to be especially reluctant to second-guess
presidential terminations.44
In sum, it is generally accepted—although not entirely settled—
that the president has the unilateral authority to act for the United
States in withdrawing the country from a treaty. This authority stems
in part from the president’s power over diplomacy and role as head of
state, as well as from longstanding historical practice.
C. Executive Agreements
The above Section focused on Article II treaties; that is, treaties
made by presidents with the advice and consent of two-thirds of the
Senate. Starting early in U.S. history, presidents have concluded some
executive agreements without the senatorial advice and consent
process specified in Article II. For example, for many years presidents
concluded postal agreements with other nations based on
congressional authorization conferred by a 1792 statute.45 To take
another early example, during the War of 1812, President Madison
concluded an agreement with Great Britain concerning the treatment
of prisoners of war without legislative authorization or approval.46
Today, there are several accepted categories of executive
agreements: congressional-executive agreements, based on ex ante
authorization or ex post approval by a majority of Congress; treaty-

42. See Vienna Convention, supra note 9, art. 67.
43. When a nation enters into a treaty in a manner inconsistent with its fundamental law, the
nation is allowed to challenge the validity of the treaty if the inconsistency would have been
“manifest” to the other treaty parties. See id. art. 46. There is no equivalent rule in the Vienna
Convention for the unmaking of treaties. Even if there were, any U.S. law requiring legislative
approval would not be manifest at this point.
44. Cf. M. ANGELES VILLARREAL & IAN F. FERGUSSON, CONG. RES. SERV., THE NORTH
AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (NAFTA) 26 (2017) (“As a practical matter, it appears
that the President has the ability to terminate U.S. international commitments under international
agreements, including trade agreements, in accordance with the agreements’ terms and the rules
for withdrawal from treaties in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.”).
45. See Act of Feb. 20, 1792, ch. 7, § 26, 1 Stat. 232, 239.
46. See Cartel for the Exchange of Prisoners of War, Gr. Brit.-U.S., May 12, 1813, reprinted
in 2 TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ACTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 557
(Hunter Miller ed., 1931).

BRADLEY IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

1626

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

4/16/2018 10:30 PM

[Vol. 67:1615

based executive agreements, made by presidents pursuant to authority
delegated in a Senate-approved Article II treaty; and sole executive
agreements, made by the president without congressional involvement,
based on the president’s independent constitutional authority.47 Since
the 1930s, executive agreements, especially congressional-executive
agreements, have come to represent the vast majority of international
agreements made by the United States. Indeed, they now represent
well over 90 percent of all of the United States’ international
agreements.48
Most congressional-executive agreements have been ex ante—
Congress has merely delegated to presidents the authority to conclude
agreements about a certain subject, and presidents have done so
without returning to Congress for approval, sometimes long after the
statute is enacted.49 Many military assistance agreements are concluded
based on such ex ante authorization.50 Modern free trade agreements,
however, have typically been concluded ex post—Congress has voted
whether to approve them after they have been negotiated. This was
true of the NAFTA agreement. Because the Constitution does not
specifically mention the various forms of executive agreements, it of
course does not describe how the United States can exit from them. It
is generally assumed that presidents can unilaterally exit from sole
executive agreements.51 It also stands to reason that presidents can
modify treaty-based executive agreements: if the president can choose
the method of carrying out treaty authority in the first instance, the
president should be able to change that method within the scope of that
authority.
What about congressional-executive agreements? These

47. See CONG. RESEARCH. SERV., S. PRT. 106-71, TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL
AGREEMENTS: THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE 77 (Comm. Print 2001) [hereinafter
CRS Study]; RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 8, § 303.
48. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Presidential Control Over International Law,
131 HARV. L. REV. 1201, 1212–13 (2018) (documenting how executive agreements now represent
approximately 94 percent of international agreements made by the United States).
49. See Hathaway, supra note 36, at 145.
50. See id. at 157.
51. See, e.g., STEPHEN P. MULLIGAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44761. WITHDRAWAL
FROM INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS: LEGAL FRAMEWORK, THE PARIS AGREEMENT, AND
THE IRAN NUCLEAR AGREEMENT 6 (2017) (“Based on past practices, it appears to be generally
accepted that, when the President has independent authority to enter into an executive
agreement, the President may also independently terminate the agreement without congressional
or senatorial approval.”).
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agreements are fully “treaties” as a matter of international law.52 They
also frequently contain withdrawal clauses just like those found in
many modern Article II treaties. Presidential use of congressionalexecutive agreements in lieu of Article II treaties is generally assumed
to be constitutionally permissible. It is not clear whether they are fully
interchangeable with Article II treaties under U.S domestic law. A
number of commentators, and the Restatement (Third) of Foreign
Relations Law, argue that they are,53 while others suggest modest limits
based, for example, on historical practice.54 But everyone seems to
agree that Article II treaties and congressional-executive agreements
are roughly equivalent in legal status to federal statutes, and thus are
subject to the later-in-time rule; that is, if a treaty or congressionalexecutive agreement conflicts with a federal statute, whichever came
about later in time controls.55
II. PRESIDENTIAL TERMINATION OF CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE
AGREEMENTS
Some commentators who accept unilateral presidential power to
terminate Article II treaties contend that this power does not extend
to congressional-executive agreements. They make three principal
arguments: first, that congressional-executive agreements—especially
in the area of international trade—are based on “exclusive”
congressional powers, which means that Congress must be involved in
their termination;56 second, that terminating a congressional-executive

52. Under international law, a treaty includes any “international agreement concluded
between States in written form and governed by international law.” Vienna Convention, supra
note 9, art. 2(1)(a).
53. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 8, § 303 cmt. e; HENKIN, supra note 7, at
217; Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 HARV. L. REV. 799, 806
(1995) (naming scholars who have argued in favor of full interchangeability); cf. Oona A.
Hathaway, Treaties’ End: The Past, Present, and Future of International Lawmaking in the United
States, 117 YALE L.J. 1236, 1270 (2008) (concluding that congressional-executive agreements are
almost always interchangeable with Article II treaties).
54. See, e.g., Peter J. Spiro, Treaties, Executive Agreements, and Constitutional Method, 79
TEX. L. REV. 961, 993–1003 (2001); John C. Yoo, supra note 6, at 852.
55. See RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES: TREATIES § 109 (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 1, 2016) [hereinafter
RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) Draft 1].
56. See Ku & Yoo, supra note 6 (“[T]rade deals are different, because under the
Constitution’s Commerce Clause, only Congress may alter our tariff, tax and customs laws.”);
Trachtman, supra note 6 (manuscript at 10) (“If the President is not to directly and importantly
‘regulate’ commerce, in usurpation of Congress’ exclusive power, then the presidential power to
send the notice of termination cannot be exercised independently of congressional
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agreement is tantamount to terminating a statute, which the president
cannot do unilaterally;57 and, third, that unlike the termination of
Article II treaties, there is little historical practice supporting unilateral
presidential termination of congressional-executive agreements.
Before evaluating these commentators’ arguments, it is worth
noting that the overall claim they are making is counterintuitive.
Consider NAFTA, for example. Although it is a congressionalexecutive agreement, it is fully a “treaty” on the international plane.
Moreover, almost everyone assumes that NAFTA could have been
concluded as an Article II treaty.58 Article 2205 of NAFTA permits a
party to withdraw from the agreement “six months after it provides
written notice of withdrawal to the other Parties.”59 If NAFTA had
been concluded as an Article II treaty, the commentators I am
disagreeing with would apparently accept that the president could
invoke the withdrawal clause unilaterally. They contend, however, that
because NAFTA was concluded with majority congressional approval,
the president lacks unilateral termination authority. This argument is
puzzling, because one might assume that, if anything, presidential
termination authority should be lower for Article II treaties than for
congressional-executive agreements. Article II treaties are the most
formal means of concluding international agreements and involve what
is in practice the most difficult procedure, and there has been
controversy over unilateral presidential authority to terminate them.
But, as the Congressional Research Service noted in its comprehensive
2001 study of treaties, presidential authority to terminate non–Article

authorization.”); see also Tim Meyer, Trump’s Threat to Withdraw from NAFTA May Hit a
Hurdle: The US Constitution, CONVERSATION (Aug. 15, 2017), http://theconversation.com/
trumps-threat-to-withdraw-from-nafta-may-hit-a-hurdle-the-us-constitution-81444
[https://perma.cc/4RTE-3VHT] (“The Constitution plainly assigns power over the policy areas
covered by trade agreements—foreign trade and tariffs (taxes levied on imported goods)—to
Congress, not the president.”).
57. See Trachtman, supra note 6 (manuscript at 10–11) (“[B]y independently terminating a
trade agreement, the President would be independently repealing, if not a statute per se, a treaty
transposed into domestic law by statute. Thus, if the President acts independently to terminate a
trade agreement, his action might be understood as partially repealing a statute.”); Yoo, supra
note 6, at 815 (“This . . . would provide the President with the heretofore unknown power of
executive termination of statutes.”).
58. Indeed, some commentators and litigants argued that it had to be concluded that way,
although the argument did not prevail in court. See Made in the USA Found. v. United States, 56
F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1313–17 (N.D. Ala. 1999), aff’d on other grounds, 242 F.3d 1300 (11th Cir. 2001).
59. North American Free Trade Agreement art.2205, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 107
Stat. 2057 (1993).
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II agreements “has not been seriously challenged.”60
A. “Exclusive” Congressional Authority?
The first argument for distinguishing between congressionalexecutive agreements and Article II treaties with respect to
presidential termination authority is that congressional-executive
agreements, at least in subject areas like trade, are based on
“exclusive” congressional authority.61 In particular, the argument has
been made that only Congress can regulate commerce, and when
Congress does so in a congressional-executive agreement, the
president lacks authority to terminate what Congress has done.
For a number of reasons, this is not a strong argument. It is true
that Congress has extensive authority to regulate commerce, and it has
invoked its foreign commerce authority to justify the constitutionality
of some congressional-executive agreements.62 But the suggestion that
the commerce authority is exclusive in a way that would distinguish
congressional-executive agreements from Article II treaties is
unpersuasive.
As an initial matter, characterizing the commerce power as
exclusive is odd, in that the domestic aspects of this power are not even
exclusive from a federalism standpoint because states have concurrent
authority to regulate commerce.63 Of course, the claim here is that the
commerce power is exclusive from a horizontal, separation of powers
standpoint. But that is not true either. There may be some powers that
only Congress can exercise at the horizontal level, and thus that cannot
be exercised, for example, by the Senate and president when making
treaties. The most likely example is the power to appropriate money
from the Treasury. Article I, Section 9 of the Constitution directs that
“[n]o money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of
Appropriations made by Law,”64 and it has long been assumed that this

60. CRS Study, supra note 47, at 199.
61. See infra text accompanying note 56.
62. See, e.g., Made in the USA, 56 F. Supp. 2d at 1317 (endorsing the argument that “the
Commerce Clause, coupled with the Necessary and Proper Clause and the President’s foreign
relations powers, provides sufficient authority for the completion of NAFTA”).
63. See, e.g., Pike v. Bruce Church, 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (“Where the [state] statute
regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate
commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is
clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.”).
64. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
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means that only Congress can make appropriations.65 It is possible,
although less certain, that the power to impose taxes and tariffs is also
an exclusive power given the mandate in Article I, Section 7 that “[a]ll
Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of
Representatives . . . .”66 Even for such exclusive congressional powers,
it has long been settled that treaties can address these matters as long
as the treaties are non-self-executing and thus require implementing
legislation in order to have domestic effect.67
Importantly, however, the commerce power has never been
considered one of these exclusive powers. As a result, there is no
question that the Senate and president can make treaties regulating
commerce, and that these treaties can be self-executing.68 Indeed, not
only have Article II treaties regulating international commerce been
common, they were the only way in which the United States concluded
commercial agreements until the late nineteenth century. And
presidents have acted unilaterally in terminating commerce-related
Article II treaties. To take just a couple of examples, President
Franklin Roosevelt terminated a commercial treaty with Italy in 1936,
and President Reagan terminated a “friendship, commerce, and
navigation” treaty with Nicaragua in 1985.
The D.C. Circuit usefully explained the relationship between
Congress’s powers and the Article II treaty power in Edwards v.
Carter.69 The issue in that case was whether the president could convey
the Panama Canal Zone back to Panama by means of a treaty instead
of a statute. Those challenging President Carter’s action contended

65. See, e.g., Edwards v. Carter, 580 F.2d 1055, 1058 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (“[T]he expenditure of
funds by the United States cannot be accomplished by self-executing treaty; implementing
legislation appropriating such funds is indispensable.”); Turner v. Am. Baptist Missionary Union,
24 F. Cas. 344, 345 (C.C.D. Mich. 1852) (“[M]oney cannot be appropriated by the treaty-making
power.”).
66. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1.
67. See RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) Draft 2, supra note 8, § 110, reporters’ note 11.
68. See, e.g., HENKIN, supra note 7, at 195 (“Treaties have dealt with many matters that were
also subject to legislation, e.g., tariffs and other regulations of commerce with foreign nations
. . . .”). Professor John Yoo’s argument against a presidential power to terminate congressionalexecutive agreements connects to his narrow originalist conception of the Article II treaty power,
pursuant to which treaties could never be self-executing for matters falling within Congress’s
Article I powers. See John C. Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution: Treaties, Non-Self-Execution,
and the Original Understanding, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1955 (1999). This conception is at odds with
the understandings and practices that have prevailed since the Founding. See Carlos Manuel
Vázquez, Laughing at Treaties, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2154, 2191 (1999) (noting that Yoo’s argument
“has been decisively rejected by history and tradition”).
69. Edwards v. Carter, 580 F.2d 1055 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
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that the assignment of power to Congress in Article IV, Section 3 of
the Constitution to “dispose of and make all needful Rules and
Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to
the United States” was “exclusive” and thus could not be exercised by
the president and Senate. The D.C. Circuit disagreed:
The grant of authority to Congress under the property clause states
that “The Congress shall have Power . . . ,” not that only the Congress
shall have power, or that the Congress shall have exclusive power. In
this respect the property clause is parallel to Article I, § 8, which also
states that “The Congress shall have Power . . . .” Many of the powers
thereafter enumerated in § 8 involve matters that were at the time the
Constitution was adopted, and that are at the present time, also
commonly the subject of treaties. The most prominent example of this
is the regulation of commerce with foreign nations, Art. 1, § 8, cl. 3,
and appellants do not go so far as to contend that the treaty process
is not a constitutionally allowable means for regulating foreign
commerce.70

As the court noted, no one thought to contend that the commerce
power was exclusive.
To be sure, there is one sense in which the commerce power is
exclusive at the horizontal level, but it is only in the same sense in which
most of Congress’s powers are exclusive—the president lacks the
unilateral authority to regulate the subject.71 The president cannot
unilaterally regulate commerce, just as the president cannot
unilaterally regulate intellectual property, or the environment, or civil
rights. This is not because there is anything special about the commerce
power; rather, it is simply because the president lacks legislative
authority.72
The only relevant implication of this exclusivity for the present
discussion is that presidents presumably cannot conclude sole
executive agreements regulating commerce—or intellectual property,
the environment, civil rights, and many other matters. Rather, it is
generally thought that presidents can conclude sole executive
agreements only if the agreements relate to their independent Article
70. Id. at 1057–58.
71. See, e.g., Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal., 512 U.S. 298, 329 (1994) (“The
Constitution expressly grants Congress, not the President, the power to ‘regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations.’” (quoting U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 3)).
72. See, e.g., Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 526–27 (2008) (“[T]he President’s power to see
that the laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker.” (quoting
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952))).
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II powers, such as the commander-in-chief power or the recognition
power, as informed by longstanding practice. But this limitation on the
president’s sole executive agreement authority does not yield any
particular reason to question presidential authority to terminate
congressional-executive agreements, including trade agreements. Just
as presidents lack unilateral authority to regulate commerce and other
subjects through sole executive agreements, they also lack the
unilateral authority to conclude Article II treaties. And yet most
commentators assume that they can terminate such treaties. In other
words, a lack of unilateral presidential authority to conclude such
agreements is not thought to imply a lack of unilateral presidential
authority to terminate them.73
It is true that congressional-executive agreements inherently have
something that Article II treaties do not—an enactment passed by a
majority of both houses of Congress. As a result, unlike treaties, these
agreements can be self-executing even with respect to issues falling
within Congress’s exclusive authority, such as appropriations. But
there is no inherent logical connection between the president’s
authority to terminate an agreement and an agreement’s need for
legislation to carry out its terms. If one accepts that presidents may
terminate both self-executing and non-self-executing Article II
treaties, the mere fact that congressional-executive agreements might
have more ability to be self-executing in certain circumstances does not
explain why termination authority should be any different.
B. Are Congressional-Executive Agreements the Same as Statutes?
Another argument made against a unilateral presidential power to
terminate congressional-executive agreements is that, unlike Article II
treaties, congressional-executive agreements are statutes, and, as the
Supreme Court has held, the president cannot constitutionally
terminate statutes.74 In fact, however, even though congressionalexecutive agreements are connected to statutes, they are not statutes.
Congressional-executive agreements, like Article II treaties, bind
the United States to international commitments. In doing so,
congressional-executive agreements accomplish something that

73. Given the breadth of Congress’s foreign commerce power, it would also likely be difficult
in practice to draw a line between commerce-related congressional-executive agreements and
other congressional-executive agreements.
74. See Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 438 (1998).
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Congress alone lacks the power to accomplish.75 These agreements
therefore reflect a combination of congressional and presidential
authority.76 Congress’s role in congressional-executive agreements
resembles the Senate’s role in Article II treaties: its approval may be
needed, but it lacks the unilateral authority to conclude, or even to
compel the president to conclude, an international agreement. As a
result, the proposition that “presidents cannot terminate statutes” does
not translate into “presidents cannot terminate congressionalexecutive agreements.”
Some commentators have suggested that, when concluding
congressional-executive agreements, the president merely exercises
authority delegated from Congress, and that as a result the president
lacks termination authority unless such authority has also been
delegated. Putting aside the fact that the conclusion does not follow
from the premise,77 the premise is incorrect. A president concluding an
agreement does not merely exercise delegated congressional authority.
Congress has no authority to make binding international agreements
in the first place and thus cannot delegate that authority to the
president. Instead, Congress adds its commerce authority to the
president’s agreement-making authority. This is an important addition,
because without it the president could only conclude agreements under
his own constitutional authority, which, as discussed above, would not
include the ability to regulate commerce. But the same is true with
respect to Article II treaties regulating commerce—the president
75. Professor Laurence Tribe worries that the constitutional reasoning supporting such
agreements might allow Congress to conclude international agreements even over a presidential
veto, which he noted would constitute a “radical change . . . [in] the foreign policy architecture of
our constitutional system.” Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections
on Free-Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1221, 1255 (1995). But
proponents of congressional-executive agreements have not made such a claim. See, e.g., David
M. Golove, Against Free-Form Formalism, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1791, 1893–94 (1998) (accepting
that “Congress may approve agreements but for historical reasons it is enjoined from acting
independently in the realm of foreign negotiations” while noting that this proposition is consistent
with constitutional arguments supporting congressional-executive agreements).
76. See Hathaway, supra note 53, at 1336 (“The President, on the other hand, manages the
negotiations of the agreement with the foreign government and registers the formal assent of the
United States to the agreement (based on the authority or assent offered by Congress), thereby
binding the country as a matter of international law.”).
77. See Michael Ramsey, Could President Trump Unilaterally Withdraw the U.S. from its
International Agreements?, ORIGINALISM BLOG (Sept. 9, 2016), http://originalismblog.typepad.
com/the-originalism-blog/2016/09/julian-ku-on-president-trump-withdrawing-from-international
-agreementsmichael-ramsey.html [https://perma.cc/BGA8-GYJ3] (“[T]he fact that the trade
agreements are negotiated under a congressional delegation of authority does not imply any
limitation on the President. All trade authority delegated to the President is discretionary.”).
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cannot conclude those on his own constitutional authority either—and
thus this observation does not provide a reason to conclude that the
president has less termination authority for congressional-executive
agreements than for Article II treaties.
It might seem like a harder case in the event of an ex post
congressional-executive agreement, like NAFTA, where Congress
enacts legislation approving an agreement after it has been negotiated.
Is the president in effect terminating that legislation by withdrawing
the United States from NAFTA? Not more so, I would suggest, than
terminating a Senate resolution of advice and consent for an Article II
treaty, which similarly gives consent to an already-negotiated
agreement—a practice, again, generally assumed to be constitutional.78
Of course, there may well be other aspects of implementing legislation
for an ex post congressional-executive agreement that the president
cannot terminate. But note that this would be true as well for
legislation implementing an Article II treaty. In both situations, it may
be that the president can terminate the agreement but is stuck with the
implementing legislation unless and until Congress repeals it.79 That is
an important point, but it does not itself disallow a presidential
termination authority.
In the trade area, Congress has actually addressed the continuing
effect of its implementing legislation in the event of a termination of
the underlying agreement, and it has done so in a way that seems to
accept a presidential termination authority. The United States is a
party to fourteen free trade agreements, covering twenty countries. For
most of them, the implementing legislation provides (as it does, for
example, for the trade agreement between the United States and South
Korea) that “[o]n the date on which the Agreement ceases to be in

78. See David Golove & Marty Lederman, Do Congressional-Executive Agreements
Establish More Reliable Commitments than Treaties?, OPINIO JURIS (Mar. 21, 2008), http://
opiniojuris.org/2008/03/21/do-congressional-executive-agreements-establish-more-reliablecommitments-than-treaties/ [https://perma.cc/TE4V-43QR] (“[E]ven legislation implementing a
pact will ordinarily be dependent on the ongoing validity of the agreement under international
law.” (emphasis in original)).
79. See Hathaway, supra note 53, at 1334 (“Even though the President may be able to
‘unmake’ the international commitment created by a congressional-executive agreement as a
matter of international law, the President cannot unmake the legislation on which the agreement
rests.”). This is actually more complicated than Professor Hathaway suggests. For example, if
Congress intends its implementing legislation to last only as long as the United States remains a
party to an agreement, then the legislation may terminate of its own force after presidential
withdrawal from the agreement. See Golove & Lederman, supra note 78.
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force,” the legislation “shall cease to be effective.”80 Certain other
agreements, including NAFTA, are governed by a more general
provision in the Trade Act of 1974, which provides that, in the event of
a termination of the agreement, U.S. duties and other import
restrictions “shall not be affected . . . and shall remain in effect after
the date of such termination or withdrawal for 1 year, unless the
President by proclamation provides that such rates shall be restored to
the level at which they would be but for the agreement.”81
This legislation appears to assume that these agreements may be
terminated without congressional approval. If such approval were
required, Congress could simply address the continuing effect of its
implementing legislation and any presidential proclamations enacted
thereunder at that time rather than needing to address it in advance.
Notably, in referring generally to termination of these agreements,
Congress never says that a U.S. action to terminate the agreement
would require congressional approval. Instead, Congress merely insists
that there be U.S. withdrawal rights, and it addresses what happens to
its implementing legislation in the event of withdrawal. This silence is
especially notable given that these agreements all contain withdrawal
clauses invocable at will by either party, and presidents have long
asserted the authority to invoke similar clauses in Article II treaties.
Various forms of this trade legislation date back at least to the Trade
Act of 1930, and yet in the succeeding eighty-eight years Congress has
never sought to limit presidential termination in this legislation.
Some commentators have suggested that, by tying the continuing
effect of implementing legislation to presidential termination,
Congress is acting unconstitutionally.82 Specifically, the argument is
that, under the Supreme Court’s analysis in Clinton v. City of New
York,83 Congress cannot delegate to the president the authority to
“cancel statutes.” In Clinton, the Court held unconstitutional the Line
Item Veto Act, which allowed the president to cancel certain
provisions in appropriations statutes after they were enacted.84
Clinton is distinguishable, however, on at least four grounds. First,
and most importantly, the Court emphasized that the Line Item Veto
Act improperly allowed presidential cancellation of appropriations

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

19 U.S.C. § 3805 note (2012) (Administration of Dispute Settlement Proceedings).
Id. § 2135(e).
See Trachtman, supra note 6 (manuscript at 19–22); see also Meyer, supra note 56.
Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998).
See id. at 448–49.
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measures based on conditions that existed when Congress enacted the
measures.85 This is not true, however, if a statute’s continuing effect
turns on whether the United States remains a party to an agreement in
the future. When the president takes action in the future that relates to
a condition set forth by Congress in legislation, the president does not
cancel the legislation; rather, the president gives full effect to the
legislation containing the condition.86
Second and relatedly, the Line Item Veto Act allowed the
president to take action in conflict with congressional policy as
reflected in an appropriations statute. As the Court noted, “whenever
the President cancels an item of new direct spending or a limited tax
benefit he is rejecting the policy judgment made by Congress and
relying on his own policy judgment.”87 The trade statutes discussed
above, however, do not have this effect. Indeed, Congress’s policy is
presumably to ensure that preferential trade measures apply only while
the United States remains a party to a reciprocally binding agreement.
Therefore, it would accord with congressional policy if trade
preferences were ended when the United States withdraws from an
agreement.
Third, the Court in Clinton specifically noted that it was dealing
with a domestic statute and that there is more leeway with respect to
delegation in the area of foreign affairs, most notably trade and
commerce.88 Fourth, the Line Item Veto Act in Clinton was novel. By
85. See id. at 443 (emphasizing that “the exercise of the cancellation power within five days
after the enactment of the Balanced Budget and Tax Reform Acts necessarily was based on the
same conditions that Congress evaluated when it passed those statutes”).
86. See BRANDON J. MURRILL, CONG. RES. SERV., R44630, U.S. WITHDRAWAL FROM
FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS: FREQUENTLY ASKED LEGAL QUESTIONS 15 (2016) (“[T]he
President’s authority to exercise the power depends on a condition that did not exist when
Congress passed the [free trade agreement] implementing law.”). This is even easier to see for an
ex ante congressional-executive agreement. Imagine that Congress merely stated in a statute that
“we hereby consent in advance to the president concluding an agreement on subject X.” If the
president proceeds to conclude an agreement on that subject, and then later terminates that
agreement, he has done nothing to cancel the statute.
87. Clinton, 524 U.S. at 444.
88. See id. at 445. It is not uncommon for statutes, especially in the foreign affairs area—
sanctions laws, for instance—to set default legal mandates conditioned on presidential action or
inaction. These arrangements have not been thought to be unconstitutional. For an example, see
22 U.S.C. § 9411(a)(1) (2012) (“The President may waive . . . a requirement . . . to impose or
maintain sanctions with respect to a person, . . . after the President determines and reports to the
appropriate congressional committees that it is vital to the national security interests of the United
States to waive such sanctions.”). See also Edward T. Swaine, The Constitutionality of
International Delegations, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1492, 1548 (2004) (“Given the relative breadth of
national authority over foreign affairs, it is probable that limits on congressional power
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contrast, as noted below, many presidents have terminated trade
agreements—often, but not always with the consent of the trading
partner. These presidents and Congress have all assumed that these
terminations ended the mandated trade preferences in the
implementing legislation. It is unlikely that this practice, accepted by
both political branches and both major political parties over the course
of many administrations and congresses, would now be found to violate
the separation of powers.89
To be sure, the Supreme Court has not always deferred to
longstanding separation of powers arrangements. Most notably, it
declined to do so in INS v. Chadha,90 in which it held that a “legislative
veto” provision was unconstitutional despite decades of practice in
which Congress had enacted such provisions. But that decision, too, is
distinguishable. There, the legislative veto provision reserved power to
Congress that the Court thought conflicted with clear constitutional
text. By contrast, the trade statutes discussed above potentially
delegate authority to the president rather than Congress, and it is
difficult to see how that conflicts with clear constitutional text. It is also
worth noting that in Chadha the Court observed that Congress’s
inclusion of legislative veto provisions was not a settled practice in light
of the fact that numerous presidents had questioned their
constitutionality.91 There is no comparable level of ongoing
contestation regarding the president’s authority to terminate
international agreements.
C. What About (Lack of) Historical Practice?
Another potential reason to distinguish between presidential

established in the domestic sphere—like nondelegation—do not apply with precisely the same
force to treaties and congressional-executive agreements.”).
89. Cf. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2094 (2015) (“Over the last 100 years, there has
been scarcely any debate over the President’s power to recognize foreign states.”); NLRB v. Noel
Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2564 (2014) (“[T]hree-quarters of a century of settled practice is long
enough to entitle a practice to ‘great weight in a proper interpretation’ of the constitutional
provision.” (quoting The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655, 689 (1929))); United States v. CurtissWright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 327–28 (1936) (“A legislative practice such as we have here . . .
goes a long way in the direction of proving . . . unassailable ground for the constitutionality of the
practice, to be found in the origin and history of the power involved, or in its nature, or in both
combined.”).
90. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
91. See id. at 942 n.13 (“11 Presidents, from Mr. Wilson through Mr. Reagan, who have been
presented with this issue have gone on record at some point to challenge congressional vetoes as
unconstitutional.”).
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authority to terminate Article II treaties and presidential authority to
terminate congressional-executive agreements concerns historical
practice. The president’s authority to terminate Article II treaties
stems in part from longstanding historical practice, also known as
“historical gloss,”92 and it may appear that such gloss does not exist
with respect to the termination of congressional-executive
agreements.93 The United States has not terminated many
congressional-executive agreements, so if one looks just at that subset
of international agreements, the practice will not seem very extensive.
A threshold problem with this historical practice argument is that
it is not clear why the practice of terminating congressional-executive
agreements should be considered separately from the practice of
terminating other types of agreements, such as Article II treaties and
sole executive agreements. As demonstrated above, arguments about
a purportedly exclusive commerce clause and the disallowance of
presidential termination of statutes fail to justify a distinctive treatment
for each practice. Without a good reason for subdividing them, the
mere fact that terminations of congressional-executive agreements
have been infrequent compared to Article II treaties has little
analytical significance.
In any event, existing practice is consistent with presidential
authority to terminate congressional-executive agreements. A number
of the Article II treaties terminated throughout history have concerned
trade or commerce. Indeed, as noted above, what may have been the
very first unilateral presidential termination concerned a trade treaty.94
So there is practice with respect to terminating agreements relating to
those subject areas, without any specific authorization from the
legislative branch. In addition, in the 1950s and 1960s, presidents
terminated multiple ex ante congressional-executive agreements
relating to trade by obtaining the consent of the trading partner, but
not Congress.95 More recently, in 2012 President Barack Obama

92. See generally Bradley & Morrison, supra note 34 (discussing the nature and role of
historical gloss).
93. See Trachtman, supra note 6 (manuscript at 11–17).
94. See supra text accompanying note 26. For additional examples, see Bradley, Treaty
Termination, supra note 16, at 807, 809, 814.
95. President Johnson did so in 1969 with respect to a trade agreement with Switzerland;
President Kennedy did so in 1961 with respect to a trade agreement with Honduras; President
Eisenhower did so in 1955 with respect to a trade agreement with Guatemala; and President
Truman did so in both 1951 with respect to a trade agreement with Costa Rica, and in 1950 with
respect to trade agreements with Finland, Haiti, Nicaragua, and Sweden.
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terminated a congressional-executive agreement relating to
screwworm eradication by entering into an agreement with Mexico.96
In some instances, congressional-executive trade agreements have
been terminated even without the consent of the trading partner.97
In addition, the United States has joined a number of international
organizations through ex post congressional-executive agreements,
and presidents have sometimes unilaterally withdrawn from the
agreements. For example, the United States joined the International
Labour Organization in 1934 through a congressional-executive
agreement. In 1975, the Ford administration unilaterally withdrew the
United States from the Organization, and in 1980 the Carter
administration unilaterally had the United States rejoin.98 Similarly,
the United States became a member of the United Nations
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) through
a congressional-executive agreement, and the Reagan administration
unilaterally withdrew the United States in 1983. After the Bush
administration rejoined in 2003, the Trump administration once again
announced a withdrawal.99
Finally, Congress has not indicated that it views congressionalexecutive agreements as special for purposes of presidential
termination authority. Congress has consented to withdrawal clauses
96. See Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of the United Mexican States Relating to the Termination of the 1972 Agreement
Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the United
Mexican States to Eradicate Screwworms, Mex.-U.S., Sept. 24–25, 2012, T.I.A.S. No. 12-925.1.
97. For example, in 1955 President Eisenhower terminated a trade agreement with Ecuador
and did not claim to have obtained Ecuador’s consent. See Proclamation No. 3111 (Aug. 27, 1955),
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=107254
[https://perma.cc/F4KZ-65P6].
In
1982
President Reagan terminated a trade agreement with Argentina because of a material breach. See
Proclamation No. 4993 (Oct. 29, 1982), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=41938
[https://perma.cc/P9QN-UNRS].
98. See 22 U.S.C. § 271 (2012) (authorizing U.S. membership in the International Labor
Organization and acceptance of the ILO Constitution and subsequent amendments); U.S. DEP’T
OF STATE, DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1975, at 70–73
(Eleanor C. McDowell ed., 1976) (withdrawing from ILO); U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, DIGEST OF
UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1980, at 76–78 (Marian Nash Leich ed.,
1986) (rejoining ILO).
99. 22 U.S.C. § 287m (authorizing U.S. membership in and acceptance in UNESCO in
accordance with its constitution); U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, CUMULATIVE DIGEST OF UNITED
STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1981–1988, at 405–09 (Marian Nash (Leich) ed.,
1993) (withdrawing from UNESCO); U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, DIGEST OF UNITED STATES
PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 2003, at 421–23 (Sally J. Cummins & David P. Stewart eds.,
2004) (rejoining UNESCO); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t State, The United States Withdraws from
UNESCO (Oct. 12, 2017), https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2017/10/274748.htm [https://
perma.cc/6WFE-NQ5N].
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in these agreements without ever indicating that that presidents must
return to Congress to invoke the clauses, despite a long history of
presidents unilaterally invoking similar clauses in Article II treaties.
Moreover, as discussed above, the legislation that Congress has
enacted relating to congressional-executive agreements in the trade
area appears to assume that presidents might terminate such
agreements unilaterally. There are also examples of this sort of
legislation outside the trade area.100 In the few modern instances in
which Congress as a body has addressed the termination of treaties and
congressional-executive agreements, it has been to encourage
presidents to terminate particular agreements, not to limit their
authority to do so.
III. OTHER LIMITATIONS ON PRESIDENTIAL TERMINATION
As discussed above, if one accepts a presidential power to
terminate Article II treaties, there is little reason to conclude that this
power does not also apply to congressional-executive agreements.
Even so, there are other potential constraints on withdrawal from
international agreements.101 As an initial matter, presidents may find
that international agreements are “sticky” for a variety of reasons.
These reasons include the continuing effect of implementing legislation
and administrative regulations, as well as domestic and international
expectation interests that are generated from the agreement.
International law also constrains presidential withdrawal from
international agreements. The analysis above assumed that a president
would withdraw the United States from an agreement based on
accepted international law grounds, such as by invoking a withdrawal
clause in a treaty and giving the requisite notice. If the United States
does not comply with international law in attempting to withdraw from
a treaty, then the treaty is still binding as a matter of international law.
As a result, whether a president’s notice of treaty termination is
effective in ending corresponding U.S. obligations is ultimately
determined by international law, not U.S. law.102
100. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3181(a) (2012) (“The provisions of this chapter relating to the
surrender of persons who have committed crimes in foreign countries shall continue in force only
during the existence of any treaty of extradition with such foreign government.”).
101. See, e.g., Jean Galbraith, The President’s Power to Withdraw the United States from
International Agreements at Present and in the Future, 111 AJIL UNBOUND 445, 445–49 (2018);
Harold Hongju Koh, Triptych’s End: A Better Framework to Evaluate 21st Century International
Lawmaking, 126 YALE L.J. F. 338, 355–66 (2017).
102. See RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) Draft 2, supra note 8, § 113(2).
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Importantly, if the president cannot release the United States
from the international law obligations in an agreement, the president
may have no incentive to break international law rules for withdrawal.
To take a recent example, President Trump announced shortly after
taking office that the United States would withdraw from the Paris
climate change agreement. But he has apparently accepted that this
cannot be effectuated for some time, because the agreement specifies
that a party may not initiate withdrawal until three years after the
agreement has entered into force for that party and that such
withdrawal would then become effective one year after that.
To be sure, a president might want to terminate the domestic
effects of a treaty even without the ability to terminate the
international law effects. There are strong reasons to conclude,
however, that presidents lack such domestic termination authority.
Most notably, the Constitution makes treaties part of the supreme law
of the land, and it states that presidents are to take care that the “Laws”
are faithfully executed.103 If this reference in the Take Care Clause
encompasses treaties, as seems likely,104 a president cannot declare that
a treaty no longer has domestic effect and proceed to disregard it.105
Such action would involve violating the law, not executing the law.106
Presidential authority in this regard is different from congressional
authority. Congress can clearly end the domestic effect of a treaty even
while the United States remains a party to it. That is, Congress can
place the United States in breach of treaties, pursuant to the later-intime doctrine mentioned at Part I. Under that doctrine, a federal
statute enacted after a treaty controls as a matter of domestic law if the
statute conflicts with the treaty.107 But this is because, in the U.S.
103. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
104. See, e.g., Michael D. Ramsey, Torturing Executive Power, 93 GEO. L.J. 1213, 1231–32
(2005).
105. Non-self-executing treaties may complicate this conclusion. The Supreme Court has
explained that a non-self-executing treaty “does not by itself give rise to domestically enforceable
federal law.” Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 505 n.2 (2008). There is some uncertainty about
whether such treaties qualify as domestic law for purposes of the Take Care Clause. See Ramsey,
supra note 104, at 1232–33.
106. See Derek Jinks & David Sloss, Is the President Bound by the Geneva Conventions?, 90
CORNELL L. REV. 97, 103–04 (2004) (“[A] presidential decision to breach a treaty, in
contravention of international law, may violate the President’s duty under the Take Care Clause.”
(quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3)).
107. See RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) Draft 1, supra note 55, § 109(2). If possible, however,
courts construe statutes to avoid violation of a treaty. See id. § 109(1); see also Murray v. The
Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) (“[A]n act of Congress ought never
to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains . . . .”).
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domestic legal system, both treaties and federal statutes are types of
law—and, as the domestic lawmaker for the United States, Congress
can alter the controlling law.108 By contrast, the president is not a
domestic lawmaker.109
Nevertheless, the Bush administration’s Office of Legal Counsel
(OLC) suggested in a 2002 memorandum that a president could
suspend the effect of a treaty even when suspension was not
permissible under international law.110 The memorandum claimed that
“[t]he President’s power to suspend treaties is wholly discretionary,
and may be exercised whenever he determines that it is in the national
interest to do so.”111 Shortly after President Obama took office,
however, his OLC disavowed this and another similar memorandum
from the Bush administration.112 The Obama OLC noted that it had
“found the two opinions’ treatment of this history to be unpersuasive,
their analysis equating treaty termination with treaty suspension to be
doubtful, and their consideration of the Take Care Clause to be
insufficient.”113
In addition to these constraints, Congress can probably limit
presidential termination authority if it wishes. For a congressionalexecutive agreement, such a limitation could be included in the
108. See, e.g., Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 600 (1889) (“If the treaty operates by its
own force, and relates to a subject within the power of Congress, it can be deemed in that
particular only the equivalent of a legislative act, to be repealed or modified at the pleasure of
Congress.”); Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 599 (1884) (“The Constitution gives [a treaty] no
superiority over an act of Congress in this respect, which may be repealed or modified by an act
of a later date.”).
109. See Medellin, 552 U.S. at 526–27 (“[T]he President’s power to see that the laws are
faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker.” (quoting Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952))).
110. See Memorandum from John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen. & Robert J.
Delahunty, Special Counsel, Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to John Bellinger, III,
Senior Assoc. Counsel to the President & Legal Adviser to the Nat’l Sec. Council, Authority of
the President to Suspend Certain Provisions of the ABM Treaty (Nov. 15, 2001),
http://www.justice.gov/olc/docs/memoabmtreaty 11152001.pdf [https://perma.cc/2Y4Y-FWCH].
111. Id. at 12.
112. See Memorandum from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen.,
for the Files, Status of Certain OLC Opinions Issued in the Aftermath of the Terrorist Attacks of
September 11, 2001, at 8–9 (Jan. 15, 2009), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/legacy/
2009/03/09/ memostatusolcopinions01152009.pdf [https://perma.cc/9SEJ-JF9T] (indicating that
the two memoranda should not be relied upon “to the extent they suggest[] that the President has
unlimited authority to suspend a treaty beyond the circumstances traditionally recognized”).
113. Id. at 9. The Obama OLC also observed, however, that a 2007 memorandum it was not
disavowing asserted that presidents have traditionally exercised unilateral power to suspend
treaties “where suspension was authorized by the terms of the treaty or under recognized
principles of international law.” Id.
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legislation authorizing or approving the agreement. For Article II
treaties, the Senate could include it in its resolution of advice and
consent. Such limitations could require legislative assent to
termination, or something less than that, such as advance notice to
Congress.114 Under Justice Jackson’s canonical framework in
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer for analyzing presidential
power, these limitations would be binding on the president unless they
invaded an exclusive presidential power.115
Absent any constitutional text specifically addressing termination
authority, and given Congress’s involvement in most nineteenthcentury treaty terminations, it is difficult to conclude that treaty
termination authority is an exclusive presidential power.116 Indeed,
even in the twentieth century, Congress sometimes involved itself in
treaty terminations. In 1986, for example, Congress enacted legislation
over President Reagan’s veto, directing the secretary of state to
terminate two agreements with South Africa—an Article II tax treaty
and a congressional-executive agreement relating to air services—and
the secretary of state did so.117 Another post–World War II example of
congressional involvement in the termination of international
agreements was in the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951.
There, Congress directed the president “[a]s soon as practicable” to
“take such action as is necessary to suspend, withdraw or prevent the
application of” concessions “contained in any trade agreement entered
into under authority of section 350 of the Tariff Act of 1930” relating
114. A presidential administration could attempt to limit the treaty withdrawals of future
administrations by, for example, requiring certain internal executive branch processes prior to
such action. See Galbraith, supra note 101, at 449.
115. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637–38 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring) (“When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied
will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own
constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter. Courts can
sustain exclusive presidential control in such a case only by disabling the Congress from acting
upon the subject.”); cf. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 593 n.23 (2006) (“Whether or not the
President has independent power, absent congressional authorization, to convene military
commissions, he may not disregard limitations that Congress has, in proper exercise of its own
war powers, placed on his powers.”).
116. See CRS Study, supra note 47, at 199 (“[T]he assertion of an exclusive Presidential power
in the context of a treaty is controversial and flies in the face of a substantial number of precedents
in which the Senate or Congress have been participants.”). There might be narrow instances in
which a congressional restriction on the termination of a treaty would improperly interfere with
an exclusive presidential power, such as the president’s power over recognizing foreign
governments and territories.
117. See Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-440, 100 Stat. 1086, 1100,
1104.
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to imports from the Soviet Union and Soviet bloc countries.118
President Truman relied on the Act in terminating a number of
congressional-executive trade agreements.119 If termination is, as it
appears to be, a concurrent rather than exclusive power, Congress can
regulate it.120
CONCLUSION
This Article assumes for the sake of argument that presidents can
legally withdraw the United States from Article II treaties. Substantial
arguments support that assumption, but the Supreme Court has not
dispositively resolved the issue. If that assumption falters, so too does
the proposition that presidents can withdraw the United States from
congressional-executive agreements. But if presidents do have the
legal authority to withdraw from Article II treaties, it is not clear why
that authority would not extend to congressional-executive
agreements.
This Article focuses exclusively on the proper legal analysis of
unilateral presidential termination authority rather than on the
underlying policy issues associated with the exercise of such authority.
The Article does not endorse presidential withdrawal from any
particular international agreements. Nor does it suggest that
unfettered presidential withdrawal authority is always desirable. It
might be better for the stability of U.S. foreign relations if presidential
withdrawal authority were subject to greater constraints, at least for
certain types of agreements. Any such constraints, however, likely will
118. Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951, Pub. L. No. 82-50, § 5, 65 Stat. 72, 73.
119. See OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE
UNITED STATES, 1951, EUROPE: POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS, VOLUME IV,
PART 2, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1951v04p2/d169 [https://perma.cc/2JCX
-RMPV].
120. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 8, § 339 n.3 (“[A]s a condition applicable to the
treaty before it and having a plausible relation to its adoption, such a condition [on termination]
would presumably be valid . . . , and if the President proceeded to make the treaty he would be
bound by the condition.”); CRS Study, supra note 47, at 208 (“To the extent that the agreement
in question is authorized by statute or treaty, its mode of termination likely could be regulated by
appropriate language in the authorizing statute or treaty.”); see also, e.g., Kristen E. Eichensehr,
Treaty Termination and the Separation of Powers, 53 VA. J. INT’L L. 247, 279–86 (2013) (arguing
that “for cause” limitations imposed by the Senate on the President’s treaty-termination power
would be constitutional). Professor Hathaway argues that, as a matter of constitutional
interpretation, “the case for congressional control over withdrawal from congressional-executive
agreements is much stronger than the case for congressional control over withdrawal from
treaties.” Hathaway, supra note 53, at 1323. I doubt this, but I nevertheless agree that Congress
could regulate termination of such agreements.
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need to come from either the Senate, when approving Article II
treaties, or from the full Congress.

